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History of Negotiations and Politics of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper examines the United States' negotiation strategy in the First Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks. It uses a framework that combines Graham and Allison's 
bureaucratic politics model; negotiation theory articulated by Thompson; and a modified 
version of two level games as articulated by Knopf. This paper argues that these three 
frameworks reveal that the SALT negotiations required President Nixon to satisfy five 
different negotiating partners: the American bureaucracy, Congress, the American public, 
America's NATO Allies, and the Soviet Union. One must consider all of these five 
groups to avoid viewing American negotiating positions like the decision to offer to 
reduce their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA),  the decision to not 
come up with a clear negotiating objective and the decision to deny the opportunity to 
"expand the pie" by including medium range nuclear weapons as irrational.
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 On May 26, 1972, President of the United States Richard M. Nixon and the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid I. Brezhnev, two 
men who had the power to launch a nuclear war that could destroy civilization in the 
northern hemisphere met to sign two agreements in St. Vladimir Hall in the Kremlin. 
These two documents, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement with 
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement) marked the 
first step in limiting strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. Together these 
two agreements marked the culmination of the first round of the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks or SALT. 1 
 It is easy to view the first SALT agreement as a moment made possible by the 
actions of the Soviet Union and the United States acting as unitary states in their own best 
interests. This view describes the two countries and their respective leaders as unitary 
actors who both negotiate to achieve their rational interests. This view is not 
unreasonable given the outcome of the first SALT negotiations. However, this limited 
view is what political scientists Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin label as 
"Model I." Model I ignores the multitude of actors within a state and thus does not 
present a holistic picture of how foreign policy is conducted.2 Allison and Halperin 
propose instead a Bureaucratic Model of Politics which defines decision making policies 
based on game theory and the interests of those in government.3 This model provides a 
                                                 
1
 All references to SALT or the first phase of SALT in this paper refers to the first phase of Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks that began with the talks in Helsinki on November 17, 1969 and concluding with the 
ratification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement with Respect to Offensive 
Nuclear Arms. 
 
2
 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications," World Politics 24.S1 (1972): 41-42. 
 
3
 Ibid., 43-47. 
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much better understanding of the actions of the United States Government during the 
negotiations. However, as Fisher et al points out in their case study of the first SALT 
negotiations, the president has to appeal to five different levels of actors: the bureaucracy; 
the United States Congress; the American people; allies in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO); and the Soviet Union.4 To better evaluate how the United States 
managed these multilevel negotiations this paper uses the framework for negotiations laid 
out in Leigh H. Thompson's The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator to better understand 
the process of the United States' negotiation and the emergence of United States' 
positions. Thompson's framework will be combined with Allison and Halperin's game 
theory framework and Knopf's models of how domestic politics can effect foreign policy 
to model the negotiations. The model will show how each of the five levels played into 
the creation of a negotiating position and a final agreement.  Without the framework of 
the five levels of negotiation Nixon's negotiating strategies could seem irrational based 
on Thompson's bargaining framework. First, as this paper shows, without this model 
Nixon's decision to damage his bargaining position by deciding to change the deployment 
of the American Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System so that the system would serve the 
more limited role of protecting the American nuclear deterrent instead of protecting the 
population of the United States from a nuclear first strike. Nixon also appeared to weaken 
his bargaining position by offering to put a moratorium on the testing of one of the only 
nuclear weapons systems the Americans were ahead in developing, Multiple 
Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). Throughout this process Nixon 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
 Rodger Fisher, A. K. Schneider, and B. Ganson, "Case Study on Arms Control: The Antiballistic Missile 
Treaty," in Coping with International Conflict: A systematic Approach to Influence in International 
Negotiation (Upper Saddle River, NJ : Prentice Hall, 1997), 96. 
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also did not establish a clear goal for the negotiations and the result appears to be 
multiple, contradictory negotiation positions being put forward at the same time an 
activity that chief SALT negotiator for the United States called playing "games" where 
the Soviets were expected to guess at what the United States was actually proposing.5 
This action is illogical according to negotiation theory where you want to make the first 
offer to establish the "anchor point" around which negotiation will take place.6 Lastly, 
Nixon refused to meet the Soviet desire to include so called Forward Based Systems 
(FBS), which included American aircraft in Europe even though the Soviets expressed 
interest in expanding the pie of negotiation in this area. 
Background 
 To better understand the negotiation of SALT, some background on the origins of 
the United States-Soviet Union relationship and how that relationship eventually led to 
the SALT negotiations is essential. Antipathy between United States and Soviet Union 
dates back to the founding of the Soviet Union. The Saturday Evening Post called the 
revolution that formed the Soviet Union a, "dictatorship of the dregs," and predicted that 
the revolution would be overturned.7 The United States sent in troops to help ensure that 
outcome. Even after the two allies had overcome the Axis Powers in the Second World 
War, a cloud lay over their relationship. Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin had hoped for a 
strategic balance after the war to ensure Soviet security, but the American use of the 
                                                 
5
 Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1990), 152. 
 
6
 Leigh H. Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5th ed (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 
2012), 44. 
 
7
 Quoted in Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1987 [2009]), 113. 
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atomic bomb at Hiroshima in 1945 had broken the balance and thus he began a crash 
Soviet program to match the Americans' nuclear program.8  
 The Soviet game of catch-up became a lot easier when Robert S. McNamara and 
the Johnson Administration began to see the build up of nuclear weapons as offering little 
security for a great cost to the United States' budget. 9 They therefore set a ceiling for 
strategic nuclear weapons of 1,054 ICBMs.10 The United States shifted its focus from 
quantity of nuclear weapons to making qualitative improvements including an increase in 
accuracy and greater ability to penetrate Soviet defenses hoping such expenditures would 
be more cost effective.11 These arguments were not completely dominate, as evidenced 
by the fact that while McNamara did manage to control ICBM production he could not 
stop the Joint Chiefs of Staff from persuading Congress to approve more funding for 
bombers over his opposition for five consecutive years.12 
 While the Americans worked on qualitative improvements, the Soviet Union, 
motivated by their perceived failure during the Cuban Missile Crisis to gain at least 
                                                 
8
 Stephen J. Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Nuclear Forces 
(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 7. 
 
9
 Robert S. McNamara, "National Security and Nuclear Strength," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 20.2 
(March 1964), 35-39. 
 
10
 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011 [1979]), 125.  
 
11
 Albert C. F. Westphal, "Staff Memorandum on the Current status of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Program, March 3, 1967" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), 1. 
 
12
 Lori Esposito Murray,  "SALT I and Congress: Building a Consensus for Nuclear Arms Control, Vol. 1" 
(Ph.D Diss., Johns Hopkins University: 1989), 65. 
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nuclear parity, began building up ICBMs.13 Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union began the 
most intense portion of the arms race and came close to that goal.14  
 While the offensive arms race continued, both sides were developing defenses 
against the new threat of ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union also began testing an ABM 
defense system in the 1950s that developed into the A-35 anti-ballistic missile system, 
which was deployed around Moscow.15 The United States had also been testing their own 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems since the 1950s, however most experts had opposed its 
deployment due to expenses and technical inadequacies.16 The Joint Chiefs of Staff began 
encouraging Congressional support for an ABM system arguing that such a system could 
limit the amount of damage that would be done in the event of a nuclear war.17 
McNamara attempted on several occasions resist this demand by the Pentagon by arguing 
it was not feasible and cost effective plan.18 Appeals to delay the deployment of the 
American ABM system held until 1967 when President Lyndon B. Johnson announced 
observing deployment of the Russian A-35 system in January 1967.19 The Congress 
responded by pushing harder for the deployment of an American ABM system to counter 
                                                 
13
 Zaloga, Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, 87. 
 
14
 Ibid., 101-102. 
 
15
 Ibid., 101-102, 126. The A-35 was originally only capable of intercepting eight ICBMs. 
 
16
 Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Disarmament Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of 
ABM Systems, First Session, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 25-26 
(Statement Donald J. Fink). 
 
17
 Betty Goetz Lall, "Congress Debates the ABM," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 23.7 (September 1967), 
28-30. 
 
18
 Jeremy J. Stone, "McNamara's Story Continues," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 22.2 (April 1966), 40. 
 
19
 Smith, Doubletalk, 19. The system was codenamed "Galosh" by the Americans. 
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the Soviets.20 McNamara responded by trying to link nonuse of ABM system to arms 
control with the Soviet Union.21 The result was that Johnson proposed a "thin" ABM 
system called Sentinel and attempted to begin strategic arms limitation talks with the 
Soviet Union.22 
 Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States at this point 
appeared to be possible for several reasons. First, the United States had developed 
satellite technology that allowed it to observe Soviet arms deployment without need for 
the onsite inspections that had previously been necessary and had destroyed prior chances 
at arms control agreements.23 Second, both the United States and the Soviet Union had a 
common interest in avoiding a defensive ABM arms race that could end up costing in the 
billions of dollars.24 This is especially true given that the United States was facing 
balance of payments deficits and was negotiating tough budgetary constraints as a result 
of the Vietnam war,25 while the Soviet Union was facing pressure to shift production to 
consumer goods and division over the next five year plan. However, the Soviet Union 
still remained behind the United States in all major measures of strategic forces and thus 
the military remained opposed to strategic arms negotiations, seeing them as 
                                                 
20
 Murray, "SALT I and Congress, Vol. 1," 78-79. 
 
21
 McNamara interview with Murray quoted in Ibid., 92. 
 
22
 Murray, "SALT I and Congress," 99-100. 
 
23
 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT I (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989 [1973]), 70-
71. 
 
24
 Westphal, "Staff Memorandum," 3, 5-6. 
 
25
 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 537, 409, 438-442. 
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treasonous.26 The result was that Premier Alexi Kosygin ignored American attempts to 
discuss arms control at the Glassboro Summit in Glassboro, New Jersey with the Johnson 
Administration.27 Another opportunity for the beginning of arms control came in 1968 
but it was shortly followed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was caused 
in part by continuing Soviet military opposition to arms control.28 The invasion forced 
Johnson to ignore the Soviet proposal for a summit on arms control and at the urging of 
the incoming Nixon Administration Johnson decided to stop trying for an arms control 
deal so as not to force the Nixon Administration to accept a deal they may not want.29 
 Thus the Nixon Administration entered into a situation where both sides had 
expressed their desire for the beginning of the strategic arms negotiations. The Johnson 
Administration had even conducted internal bureaucratic negotiations to come up with a 
position approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff meaning that the potentially most vocal 
bureaucratic opponents had endorsed the move.30 However, Nixon had yet to committee 
to arms control as a priority. In fact according to the order in which he created his 
National Security Study Memoranda, he ranked SALT behind 27 other issues,31 and he 
told his advisors that they had to keep the public option open of not beginning SALT.32  
                                                 
26
 Jonathan Haslam, Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 218. 
 
27
 Johnson, The Vantage Point, 483-484. 
 
28
 Haslam, Russia's Cold War, 240. 
 
29
 Kissinger, White House Years, 49-50. 
  
30
 Newhouse, Cold Dawn, 114-118. 
 
31
 Jeffrey W. Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation (Ithaca, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 164. 
 
32
 "Letter from President Nixon to Secretary of State Rodgers," (February 4, 1969) in Soviet-American 
Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, edited by Edward C. Keefer et al, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
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 These decisions effectively delayed the beginning of SALT. That delay appeared 
to have several advantages from Nixon's prospective. First, it ensured that Nixon was not 
bound by Johnson's positions laid out in papers that had already been exchanged with the 
Soviets. Second, the delay allowed Nixon a chance to draft his own policy based on a 
thorough review of the American strategic position. This latter action was particularly 
desirable given the ad hoc nature of the formation of Johnson's SALT policy.33 Third, it 
allowed Nixon to separate himself from Johnson and thus increase the chances that he 
would be credited with the accomplishment of SALT. The desire for credit, as his aide 
Kissinger notes, was  a major motivating factor for Nixon so that this particular reason 
may have had greater weight.34 
Literature Review 
 The SALT negotiations that followed Nixon's delay lasted for almost Nixon's 
entire first term and have been criticized by many actors of the period. The negotiations 
are relatively recent, so much so that not all of the relevant briefings and reports have 
been declassified. However, the history of the histories of the negotiations dates back 
almost to the immediate aftermath of the talks with John Newhouse's Cold Dawn. While 
claiming to be The Story of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Cold Dawn is a 
journalist's account of the talks, based heavily on interviews with the main actors at the 
time.35 Even so, Newhouse offers one of the first accounts of the relevant levels of the 
negotiations. He cites four: negotiations between United States and Soviet Union; 
                                                                                                                                                 
Government Printing Office, 2007), 4. An identical letter was sent to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 
FRUS, SALT I, 1. 
 
33
 Newhouse, Cold Dawn, 108-139. 
 
34
 Kissinger, White House Years, e.g. 29.\ 
35
 Newhouse, Cold Dawn, 171-173. 
 
 Kempfer 11 
between the United States and its NATO allies; between the president and Congress; and 
between the respective bureaucracies.36 
 Newhouse's account was followed by memoirs and case studies that focused on 
varying aspects of the negotiations and agreements. Nixon's memoirs focused on the 
domestic and bureaucratic politics surrounding the agreement, and spend relatively little 
time on the negotiations. Nixon's memoirs focus on the domestic political dimensions of 
the agreements and observe a tendency towards distrust of the established government 
authorities which came out of Vietnam as a motivating factor in many opponents of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile system, renamed Safeguard, that he was trying to pass.37 Henry A. 
Kissinger, Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, recounts in some detail the 
negotiation process. He recounts the secrecy of the Nixon presidency which centralized 
national security policy in the White House and blamed such secrecy on Nixon for his 
paranoia regarding press leaks. That paranoia was encouraged by watching Johnson 
suffer form a large number of leaks before Nixon took office.38 This decision to 
centralize decision-making in the White House has been thought to have decreased the 
role of the bureaucracy in decision-making during the SALT negotiations.39 While such 
isolation may disincentive contributing to the policy formation process, it could also 
create an incentive to leak, as the only means of getting policy positions considered. Such 
secrecy could also result in decision-makers and their bureaucracies having incomplete 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., 31-32.  
 
37
 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (Simon and Schuster, 1995), 415-417. 
 
38
 Kissinger, White House Years, 19-32, 138. 
 
39
 e.g. Kissinger argues that it increased decisiveness but decreased consensus building, see Ibid., 805. 
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information.40 One example of how bureaucratic discontent could manifest itself during 
SALT was Gerard Smith's angry reaction to being excluded from participation in the 
Moscow Summit until called for a press conference where he responded to questions 
from the media by stating that he, the head of the SALT delegation was not familiar with 
the substance of the agreements.41 Kissinger later asked Smith if he was "trying to cause 
a panic" with his remarks.42 
 A counter to Kissinger's account are the accounts of Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency director Gerard Smith who criticized Kissinger's handling of the 
negotiations. Smith paints a picture of Kissinger as so egotistical he falsely believed he 
could confront the whole Soviet government almost single handedly while he confused 
the negotiating by conducting a back channel negotiation with Soviet Ambassador 
Anatoly Dobrynin.43 Raymond Garthoff and Thomas Graham Jr., both in the ACDA in at 
the time and thus involved in the negotiation, echo many of these criticism of Kissinger 
and the Administration for making technical decisions without consulting their experts 
and thus creating difficulties later on in the process.44 Smith did not just criticize 
Kissinger's secret negotiations but also their consequences, as he described them causing 
long delay by playing "games" with the Soviet delegation by either making propositions 
                                                 
40
 Robert Alan Strong, "Bureaucracy, Statesmanship, and Arms Control: The SALT I Negotiations" (Ph.D 
Diss., University of Virginia, 1980), 198-206. 
 
41
 See parallel accounts in Kissinger, White House Years, 1242-1243 and Smith, Doubletalk, 436-438. 
 
42
 Smith, Doubletalk, 438. 
 
43
 Ibid., 225-226, 336. 
 
44
 Thomas Graham Jr., Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Disarmament and International Law 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 46-49 and Garthoff, Raymond L.  Détente and 
Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Regan Revised Ed (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1994), 153-202. 
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that the other side would never accept or by making multiple simultaneous proposals 
without indicating which one was preferred.45 The result of these maneuvers, according 
to Smith, was that the Soviet Union had more time to build up more nuclear weapons and 
almost guaranteed that the United States would be in a position of strategic inferiority.46 
Smith and Garthoff also criticize Nixon for losing the opportunity to ban the MIRV.47 
 The political science literature is not that far removed from the narrow focus of 
the memoirs. When treated at all, SALT I is often treated as the precursor to SALT II or a 
model for a particular type of negotiation theory. These examinations generally have a 
narrow focus. For example, Lori Esposito Murray,  "SALT I and Congress: Building a 
Consensus for Nuclear Arms Control" focuses almost exclusively on Executive-
Congressional relations during SALT concluding with very little support that Nixon's 
mishandling of SALT I sewed the seeds of the failure of SALT II, by failing to 
adequately articulate the purpose of the SALT process to Congress.48 Given her focus it 
is ironic that Murray pays little attention to the revolution in begun in ABM hearings 
chaired by Albert Gore which signaled according to Alan Platt, a nascent Congressional 
"Revolution" against the norms of executive-dictated policy formation.49 Platt also points 
                                                 
45
 Smith, Doubletalk, 211-212. 
 
46
 Ibid., 457. 
 
47
 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 160-162. 
 
48
 Murray, "SALT I and Congress," 3-4. 
 
49
 Alan Platt, "The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," in The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification, 
Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell eds., The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1991), 255-258. 
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out that ratification and limited Congressional debate was made possible by a 
combination of logrolling and the extreme secrecy that characterized the negotiations.50 
 In addition to his commentary on Congressional relations, Platt is one of the first 
in the group to seriously address the impact of public opinion which he calls minimal as 
public interest was low. However, interest groups did form in response to the plan to 
install ABM sites near cities that aroused protest and scientific activism.51 
 Scott Allen's comparison of the SALT I negotiations to the Washington Naval 
Conference system points out what Murray appears to be missing. The United States and 
the Soviet Union have different conceptions of the doctrine upon which there agreement 
rests. The United States had unofficially endorsed Mutually Assured Destruction while 
the Soviet Union was still striving for superiority.52 The result of this doctrinal difference 
is that the SALT agreement is not functional as a predictor of future actions as such 
agreements are supposed to be to remain practical and effective.53 However, as Francis J. 
Gavin argues, declassified documents reveal that Nixon did not endorse the idea of 
mutually assured destruction either, as he and Kissinger believed that nuclear superiority 
was the only way the United States could keep a credible deterrent against a Soviet strike 
in Europe. The only problem was, as suggested by the background above, the United 
States lacked the economic and political will to achieve that objective.54 
                                                 
50
 Ibid., 255-264. 
 
51
 Ibid., 264-268. 
 
52
 Scott Allen, "A Comparison of the Washington Naval Arms Treaty of 1922 and the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Agreements of 1972" (Ph.D Diss., University of Hawaii, 1976), 1-14, 19-36, 196. 
 
53
 Ibid., 196, 
 
54
 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2012), 110-114. 
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 George Bunn also does not hold with the agreement as a result of doctrinal 
similarities but rather returns to a broader analysis advanced in the case study tradition. 
Bunn identifies three "committees" that the president must appeal to in addition to the 
Soviet Union: Congress, the Bureaucracy and NATO.55 As has already been noted the 
literature also includes the work of Fisher et al who describes the five constituencies that 
the this paper argues the president must satisfy, because unlike Bunn it does not assume 
that the Congress always represents domestic will, nor does it hold with Platt that 
Congress and the Bureaucracy can be removed or significantly marginalized by secrecy.  
 Having considered the specific literature on SALT it should be noted where the 
general literature places the SALT agreements. These histories tend to view SALT as 
Jonathan Haslam describes as political rather than anything that has real substantive 
importance outside the field of politics.56 
Analysis of Negotiations 
 To better examine this "political settlement," an examination of the bargaining 
process mentioned above is in order. According to Thompson, the Bargaining process 
begins with preparation. 80% of the work of negotiation is done in this phase.57 In the 
planning phase of the negotiation process the prime actor (in this case the President 
Nixon) must identify his goals and his negotiating partner's (or partners') interests. The 
president must first conduct research to determine what is possible and what his 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
55
 George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), 7. 
 
56
 Haslam, Russia's Cold War, 263. 
 
57
 Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, 13. 
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alternatives are.58 The president must make four determinations to better formulate a 
bargaining position. First, he must have determined his best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement or BATNA. Second, the actor must have determined his aspiration price, or 
the best possible deal for him and his interests. Third, the actor must determine his target 
price or objective. Lastly, the actor must determine his reservation point or the lowest 
option at which a negotiated agreement is advantageous.59 
 The President's BATNA was clearly understood from before the formal 
negotiations began and was laid out in a Department of Defense Report on the costs of 
delay. The Soviet Union was rapidly building new ICBMs and submarines while the 
United States had no new offensive weapons systems programmed to enter service until 
the mid-1970s. Thus delay in negotiation or no negotiation at all would result in the shift 
of the strategic balance in favor of the Soviet Union. The only two programs that the 
United States had planned to counter this growing advantage before 1975 was the MIRV 
and ABM programs. 60 Therefore the American BATNA was to build MIRVs and ABMs 
in an attempt to counter the looming Soviet strategic nuclear advantage. 
Rolling Back the American BATNA 
 The first part of the BATNA, the Anti-Ballistic Missile system named Sentinel 
that was approved by Johnson before he left office. The Sentinel program had not yet 
begun deployment, but had already been slated to deploy ABM launchers and radar near 
cities. Citizens in Chicago and Boston were upset by the ABM system being placed in 
                                                 
58
 Ibid., 14-16. 
 
59
 Ibid., 16. 
 
60
 "Military Consequences of a Delay in Opening Strategic Talks," in FRUS, SALT I, 2-3. There is no date 
on this document but it was prepared for the February 14, 1969 National Security Council meeting see Ibid, 
2 note 1. 
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their backyards because of two concerns first the potentially negative impact on property 
values and second reports by expert scientists that ABM systems contained nuclear 
warheads that could accidentally explode.61 The public in these cities chose to enter into 
an action game, i.e. they chose to protest. The goal of these protests was to influence 
policy formation by convincing the politicians in Congress that the median voter, the 
average person whom the needed to appeal to, to win reelection was roused against this 
measure.62 The popular actions had even swayed senators to oppose the ABM placement 
near cities including the vehemently pro-ABM Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson who 
opposed placement of an ABM system in his home state of Washington under pressure 
from his constituents.63  
 Nixon responded by preparing a new ABM system using the same components as 
Sentinel but to be deployed to defend missile silos and not around cities as Kissinger 
explained in a private meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.64 This new system was 
called Safeguard.65 Thus to retain support on Capital Hill, calm down protesters, and 
retain what he thought would be a critical "bargaining chip" in the negotiations with the 
Soviet Union Nixon was forced to devalue his BATNA to satisfy the interests of the 
American public who in turn influenced Congress. No longer would the American ABM 
system be the city-based system designed to reduce the maximum amount of damage 
                                                 
61
 Peter A. Moldauer, "The ABM Comes to Town," Bulliten of the Atomic Scientists 25.1 (January, 1969), 
4-6. Mary Silk, "Sentinel in the Backyard," in Ibid., 7. 
 
62
 Knopf, Domestic Society, 3, 54. 
 
63
 Kissinger, White House Years, 538. 
 
64
 "Memorandum of Conversation (USSR), March 3, 1969," in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 31-32. 
 
65
 FRUS, SALT I, 14. 
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from a nuclear war. It would now be a system designed to protect the American nuclear 
deterrent, its ICBM force. 
 However, Nixon's ABM BANTA was still not safe as a subcommittee chaired by 
Albert Gore relied on scientific experts to excoriate the Safeguard system. Experts 
scientists, including former presidential science advisors took stances against the ABM as 
an ineffective and costly system that the American people could not afford.66 Thus 
Congress, influenced by domestic actors, in this case scientists who shifted the 
Congressional balance of power by providing Congressmen with professional support,67 
became even less willing to fund the ABM and the President had to appeal to Gerard 
Smith to write a note supporting Safeguard expansion as an essential part of the 
American bargaining strategy telling Smith to "sign or resign."68 Thus Nixon had to 
depend on his bureaucracy as a sort of authentication to his statement that Safeguard was 
necessary to the negotiations. As Platt, cited above, noted the Congress was becoming 
more independent and less trusting of the President's word requiring him to make such 
appeals and to rely on his bureaucracy to ensure success. 
 The second BATNA strategy was the United States' program to develop MIRVs. 
The Americans were ahead in developing the MIRV technology.69 However, Nixon was 
under pressure from elements of his bureaucracy to place a moratorium on MIRV testing 
as a sign of good faith to try to get the Soviet Union to reciprocate. Acting Secretary of 
                                                 
66
 Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Disarmament  Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, passim. 
 
67
 Knopf, Domestic Society, 178-180, 186-187. 
 
68
 Nixon's notation on "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to 
President Nixon," (February 24, 1970), in FRUS SALT I, 192. 
 
69
 "Military Consequences of a Delay in Opening Strategic Talks," in FRUS, SALT I, 2, 4. 
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State Richardson and Chief Negotiator Gerard Smith both argued that if there was not a 
stop on MIRV testing, which could be verified, then the opportunity to control this 
weapon would be lost.70 That position was leaked to the press and Nixon faced not just 
bureaucratic opposition but also opposition in the Congress embodied by a sense of the 
Senate resolution that advocated a MIRV ban.71 Nixon propose a MIRV ban in one of the 
negotiating packages in the second round of the SALT negotiations at Vienna.72 
However, as Gerard Smith notes Nixon attached the requirement of onsite verification to 
the proposal of a MIRV ban, essentially ensuring that it would be rejected by the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union did not want a deal either, according to Smith.73 Thus all the 
Soviets had to do was to put a proposal on the table that would be equally unlikely to gain 
American support, which they did.74  
 In this case we see three levels of interaction the president is here interacting 
indirectly with: Congress, the Soviet Union and the bureaucracy. First, we see what 
Knopf calls his third method of the American people actively shaping government policy 
that is introducing a new idea into Congress to try to change the debate.75 This action 
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suggests that the bureaucracy can serve a duel role by both fulfilling their duty to help 
shape domestic executive policy and as an active citizen who introduces new ideas to 
Congress. Nixon responded by appeasing his bureaucracy and Congressional critics to a 
certain degree by claiming that he attempted to resolve the issue. Keeping the bureaucrats 
appeased is essential to the running of a large complicated government. Disenchanted 
bureaucrats can misinterpret or distort policy decision, 76 or in extreme circumstances 
they can rebel against the executive by engaging in policies that deliberately hurt the 
executive, such as leaking or starting false stories. Bureaucrats who do not feel like they 
are being treated properly, because the interests of their organization, which they 
associate with the national interest,77 are not being addressed may become rebellious and 
serve as the source of some of the leaks that plague the administration. Alternatively, 
bureaucrats can disrupt the policy-making process in more subtle and less intentional 
ways. As noted above Smith's temper at being the press conference at the Moscow 
Summit threatened to bias the reception of the SALT agreements. Thus it is critical for 
the Nixon Administration to maintain some bureaucratic support. While it is true that 
Kissinger and Nixon cut into the bureaucratic power base by moving foreign policy 
inside the White House to the extent possible, it was still necessary to deal with 
bureaucrats to ensure a functioning foreign policy. Nixon was able to do so in this 
situation because it could cooperate with the Soviet Union at a different level of 
negotiation to make sure the proposal appeared to fail after a good faith effort. 
The Failure to Set The American Negotiating Position 
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 The fact that Nixon was able to float the MIRV ban tied to onsite inspection in the 
negotiations without destabilizing the negotiations was due to the fact that Nixon's 
preparation for the first few rounds stopped at determining and maintaining his BATNA. 
Nixon did conduct this research by issuing National Security Study Memorandum 28 that 
order the preparation of potential positions to be taken during the SALT negotiations.78 
He reviewed several options and got various opinions on them. However, Nixon does not 
give Smith a bargaining position for the first round in Helsinki. Instead he tells Smith his 
goal is to probe the Soviet position.79 The National Security Council became concerned 
with such vague directions. In a November tenth meeting they asked what they should do 
if the Soviets ask for a proposal. Nixon responded by ordering the negotiators to go 
slowly and feel out the position of the Soviet Union.80 Thus it appears there is little 
evidence that Nixon had a position going into the first round of the SALT negotiations. 
Not only did Nixon not have a firm position but he had no target price, or ultimate goal 
for the negotiations; nor did he have a clear reservation price. Or at least that is how it 
appears. Smith observes that while Nixon did not firmly establish a position the position 
that he had the delegation table at the first round of the SALT negotiations at Helsinki as 
the suggestion for discussion covered most of the issues covered in the final agreement.81 
Thus Nixon may have made such a decision ahead of time and withheld all backup 
positions or real positions at all to avoid leaks. However, there is no evidence to suggest 
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this was the intentional method as neither Nixon nor Kissinger records such a plan in 
their memoirs of the period. Furthermore, Kissinger describes how he was delegated to 
create a plan for the second round of the SALT negotiations in Vienna without clearly 
stating that his position was approved by the president.82  
 Such an indistinct position might be desirable as a way of ensuring that the 
bureaucracy did not rebel. If Nixon did not have a firm plan going into SALT then he 
could not be said to be passing up on opportunities for arms control by those 
bureaucracies who have an institutional interest in promoting such agreement, namely the 
CIA, who would gain a more important intelligence role; the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which would be fulfilling its reason for existing by 
completing a wide ranging SALT deal; and the State Department which tended to work 
closely with the ACDA. 
 Nixon did gained some flexibility by not laying out his objectives, and he did pay 
a price. The reason for creating a reservation price, a target price and an aspiration price 
is to try to maximize one's negotiating potential and not leave potential gains on the 
table.83 While there is no solid evidence that suggest that Nixon certainly did leave 
potential gains on the table, it remains a possibility. Nixon did pay the price in two areas: 
the creation of a numerically inferior nuclear position in the agreements and the a 
deadlock over whether to include Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) that 
almost prevented the deal. 
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 What is clear is that in the time that elapsed during the negotiations Nixon did 
lose. As previously noted the longer the negotiations lasted the larger the Soviet strategic 
forces grew. However, it is very probable that the Soviet Union may not have agreed to 
an arms control agreement unless the agreement ratified their position of relative 
superiority, so criticisms that Nixon spent too much time in the negotiation and lost the 
possibility for a more equitable agreement are rather speculative at best. 
 Another consequence of not preparing a position was conflict over the inclusion 
of SLBMs. The SALT negotiations had been stalemated after the United States withdrew 
an offer to limit the deployment of ABM to just one site around the national capital as 
Americans realized that the Congress would not fund such a proposal and proceeded to 
put forward unacceptable proposals to get the Soviets to move towards proposal they 
believed Congress would be more likely to fund.84 Kissinger and Dobrynin attempted to 
break the stalemate and Kissinger hoped to gain control over the negotiation process by 
coming to an agreement. The problem with the agreement was that among other things, it 
excluded SLBMs.85 This was apparently because Kissinger had not realized that the 
American government had a strong preference for controlling SLBMs. In fact, Nixon 
believed that an agreement was possible and even desirable without SLBMs.86 However, 
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to excluding SLBMs,87 which forced the 
administration to consider walking away from the negotiation very in 1972. The Soviets 
and Americans did agree to limits on Soviet SLBMs which gave the Soviets the 
superiority that Kissinger predicted they would have had without the agreement,88 but the 
lack of communication combined with the strong position of the Joint Chiefs provided a 
real incentive for the Nixon Administration to change their positions in other levels of the 
negotiation. 
The Exclusion of Forward Based Systems (FBS) 
 While Nixon may have adopted a vague front in an attempt to keep his side 
united, Nixon was very clear on certain items. In his very first set of instructions to 
Gerard Smith he was clear that the strategic nuclear forces of Britain and France as well 
as tactical American forces in the area were not on the table.89 Nixon also made sure to 
consult with NATO members and had Gerard Smith brief the Atlantic Council prior to 
the negotiations.90 In fact, the Nixon briefs of the NATO allies that many Congressmen 
were upset that the allies were getting more information about the negotiations than 
members of his own government.91 This abundance of information an consultation was 
designed in part to assuage European fears that a SALT agreement would be the 
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beginning of a United States-Soviet Union condominium.92 Such fears could lead the 
Europeans to attack the American negotiations and appeal over the head of Nixon 
directly to the public. Such "cross-channel" appeals or appeals from governments of one 
country to domestic populations in another are particularly strong when they come from 
allies.93 Given that not too long before, American senators were refusing to pass a 
consular agreement with the Soviet Union on the grounds that Soviet Union was supply 
weapons to the North Vietnamese resistance and thereby killing Americans,94 The United 
States and the Nixon administration probably believed that they could not afford 
European opposition to a SALT agreement that had any chance of lasting through the 
long term. The United States was conscious that one of the strategies of the SALT talks 
might be to try to pull the United States away from their strong allies in Western Europe95 
and the Nixon Administration was going to do everything possible to make sure that 
would not happen. Thus when the Soviets proposed limiting American Forward Based 
Systems, or tactical nuclear weapons such as bomber, stationed in Europe or on nearby 
aircraft carriers that were capable of striking the Soviet Union, the United States flatly 
refused the offer to expand the negotiations to include FBS and the proposal was 
eventually dropped.96 
Examining the Outcomes 
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 Based on what was eventually agree, the negotiating strategy the United States 
used to preserve its BATNA appeared to be effective. While it did not have the city 
defense, it was still able to sign the ABM Treaty which capped both sides at two sites 
each, and the United States maintained MIRV which allowed them to match the Soviet 
warhead numbers while not matching the number of launchers. 
 As previously noted, the American failure to develop a firm negotiating position 
lead to delays that allowed the Soviet Union to get a superiority in the number of strategic 
launchers that was recognized in the Interim Agreement. However, the damage was not 
as bad as it might have been as the Soviets also did not want to put forward an early 
position.97 This behavior was likely due to the Soviet Union's internal divisions as 
Brezhnev had yet to consolidate his power in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. 
However, as the negotiations proceeded Brezhnev became stronger, he was able to purge 
anti-SALT members of the Politburo98 and his country's relative military position was 
improve to the point that when an agreement was in fact reached, the Soviet Union was in 
the lead in all of the armaments official controlled except for the ABM system.99 
 In the end many of the interests of the Soviet Union gained recognition of its 
superiority in some strategic arms, while the United States got the Soviet Union to stop 
widening the gap between the two nations. The Soviet Union did not have to submit to 
onsite inspections and the United States got a tacit agreement on the part of the Soviet 
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Union not to "significantly increase" in their heavy SS-9 missile which Americans feared 
would become a first strike weapon.100 Lastly, both sides benefited by the prevention of 
an defensive missile race that threatened to be incredibly expensive.101 The Americans 
were able to get both agreements ratified in no small part due to the fact that when it 
mattered each of the five groups felt that their interests were at least marginally addresed 
by the agreement. 
Conclusion 
 Based on the application of Thompson's preparation for bargaining framework, 
the bureaucratic politics theory of Allison and Halprein, and the domestic pressure 
framework of Knopf it is clear that international negotiation is not just a bargaining 
process between two unitary actors. Nor is it just a domestic battle played out on the 
international stage. The are five distinct groups of players whose interests must be 
mollified. If one of those groups interests are hurt then the entire negotiation can be in 
jeopardy which is why leaders who have highly fragmented followings, in this case at 
least, tend to take broad vague approaches and rapidly change positions. Nixon had to 
contend with the rivalries between the defense establishment and the arms control 
lobbyists both inside the bureaucracy and the Congress. Nixon also had to cut his 
BATNA to meet domestic anger at the Sentinel ABM deployment and keep 
Congressional support. Nixon also had to keep allies satisfied that they were having their 
interests protected and of course had to agree to some Soviet positions to get an 
agreement. In attempting to balance all those competing interests it is not surprising that 
Nixon may have failed to establish firm objectives for the negotiations, but such failures 
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may have cost him significant negotiating advantages. However, the appearance 
irrationality in decisions like reducing his BATNA, putting off creating a firm negotiating 
position and refusing to expand the negotiations to include Forward Based Systems. The 
conclusion appears to be that the historians and policymakers alike ignore any of Fisher 
et al's five main groups at their own risk when studying or negotiating arms control 
agreements, because no matter how hard policy-makers like Nixon tried to use secrecy to 
shut some of these parties out of the process, they could not succeed..
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